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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Citations, in their highly conventionalized forms, visibly indicate each text’s 
explicit use of the prior literature that embodies the knowledge and contentions 
of its field. Each text explicitly and implicitly invokes prior literature in order to 
provide resources for its claims, to identify issues at stake, to define its unique 
claim, and to create a stance toward all that has gone before. This relation to 
prior texts has been called intertextuality in literary and literacy studies. Because 
science and law are both complex, communal projects deeply reliant on the 
existence and production of texts, the study of intertextuality in each can tell us 
much about how each field operates and what it accomplishes as a communal, 
literate project. Studying how the intertextual systems of both meet in court can 
help us understand more deeply the ways in which science and the scientific 
literature are and are not consequential for legal deliberative processes. 
In this Article I first put citation practices and intertextuality in science and 
the law in theoretical and historical perspective, and then consider the 
intersection of science and law by identifying the judicial rules that limit and 
shape the role of scientific literature in court proceedings. One particular focus 
is the idiosyncrasies of the U.S. legal system that have specific consequences for 
both scientific and legal intertextuality in judicial reasoning. As an exploratory 
example of how these issues work in practice, I look at litigation surrounding 
phenylpropanolamine (PPA), with particular attention to one crucial study and 
one crucial case. The analysis of the court documents focuses particularly on the 
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judicial opinion as the site of judicial reasoning, though there are many other 
sites of legal argument that precede the judge’s rulings. 
Both from the historical and theoretical analysis and from the evidence of 
this one case, it is clear that, in the United States, judicial reasoning is an 
intertextually tight and self-referring system that pays only limited attention to 
documents outside the laws, precedents, and judicial rules. The window for 
scientific literature to enter the courts is narrow, focused, and highly filtered. It 
serves as a warrant for the expert witnesses’ expertise, which in turn makes 
opinion admissible in a way not available to ordinary witnesses. In an 
adversarial system, the way to attack the opinion of an expert witness or to 
make the witness and testimony inadmissible is in fact to attack the professional 
standing of the literature on which the witness relies. Although the ruling in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1 approached this state of affairs 
with a particular set of rules, the tension goes deeper than the particulars of the 
Daubert rules or the ways in which they have been applied. 
II 
CITATION FORM AND INTERTEXTUALITY 
No aspect of academic writing seems so conventional as citation format. It is 
the subject of tedious stylebooks, which define arcane rules of punctuation, 
abbreviation, and information requirements that are policed beyond the point 
of irritation by editors and instructors, requiring endless last-minute work by 
writers who did not have the foresight to anticipate all the conventional 
requirements when first beginning the project.2 The stylebooks seem so 
unsubstantive and yet so demanding—the epitome of empty convention. But of 
course there are reasons for getting citations right: to provide accurate and 
convenient access to the literature cited, so readers can follow the author back 
to his sources—not just to check up on his honesty and trustworthiness, but 
because each statement rests on an intertextual world of prior meanings, 
reasonings, reported facts, and theories. Each new statement draws on and 
focuses a previous discussion and history of communal work. Each reader 
potentially has a stake in that discussion and, in response, can be drawn further 
into the relevant literature. Each new statement using that literature provides a 
new framework of relevance and interpretation as applied to the issue at hand. 
Whereas the body of the new text provides the substantive and conceptual 
synthesis, interpretation, and deployment of the prior discussions, the citations 
provide the logistical, technical access to that literature. As such, they give clues 
to how that literature is organized and what the reader needs to know to locate 
any specific item in the archive of knowledge. These directions for finding the 
literature specifically point the reader to certain spots where only specific kinds 
 
 1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 2. See, e.g., THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et 
al. eds., 18th ed. 2005). 
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of documents on particular topics are to be found. The documents provide the 
relevant domain of discussion. Thus, the genres and topics of biochemistry 
literature pointed to by the citation formats and bibliographic tools of that field 
are distinct from those of trademark litigation, and both are distinct from those 
of forensic accounting–each with its distinct citation practices and bibliographic 
tools.3 
Each field of professional endeavor has its own methods of citation, 
developed from the dynamics of its work and the accidents of its history. These 
citation practices reflect and are part of the organization of the professional 
literature and help define what is important to know about the literature and 
how one should access it. Indeed, the conventions of citations arose out of 
managing the texts that emerged historically as relevant to the evolving field 
and that were part and parcel of its manner of work and reasoning. The 
problem that those contributing to this symposium aim to understand—how 
scientific knowledge is used in public policy and law—can be seen as a technical 
problem in intertextuality: When, how, in what form, and through what vehicle 
does the literature of science (embodying the knowledge of that field) enter 
into the textualized discussion of the differently organized domains of law, 
litigation, and public policy? Once elements of that scientific literature are 
admitted to other domains in forms acceptable and appropriate to those 
domains, how are these transformed texts used, with what standing, and with 
what consequences? 
It is within the successful speech acts of those texts—those enduring 
utterances that create the record of the professional endeavor—that the facts of 
the endeavor (whether law, science, bureaucratic registry, or sports history) are 
established and used to come to conclusions. Further, the facts remain in the 
relevant literature for others to build on, use, or attempt to write over with new 
facts. Whatever the world is outside the textualized endeavors, to be part of the 
calculation, memory, and continuing thought of these literate endeavors, the 
facts must be inscribed within the relevant texts in a way that will be perceived 
as having both standing within its field and the robustness to continue that 
standing. Those texts provide the common knowledge and reference point for 
all individuals versed in the field. Nonetheless, for those textually located facts 
in the archive of the field to have meaning and relevance in any new or current 
issue before the field, these prior texts must be reprised and invoked either 
explicitly or implicitly, so that they are alive in the new space of calculation.4 
 
 3. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF SCI. EDITORS, SCIENTIFIC STYLE AND FORMAT: THE CSE MANUAL 
FOR AUTHORS, EDITORS, AND PUBLISHERS (7th ed. 2006); Editorial Policy and Style Information, 
ACCT. REV. (Am. Acct. Ass’n, 2008), available at http://aaahq.org/pubs/EdPolicies/REV_EdPolicy.pdf. 
 4. For the theoretical underpinnings of this chapter as articulated in this paragraph, see generally 
J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson & Marina Sbisà eds., Harvard Univ. 
Press 1975) (1962) (discussing speech-act theory); Charles Bazerman, Intertextualities: Volosinov, 
Bakhtin, Literary Theory, and Literacy Studies, in BAKHTINIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LANGUAGE, 
LITERACY, AND LEARNING 53 (Arnetha F. Ball & Sarah Warshauer Freedman eds., 2004) (parsing 
Bakhtin’s theory of intertextuality); CHARLES BAZERMAN, SHAPING WRITTEN KNOWLEDGE: THE 
GENRE AND ACTIVITY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL ARTICLE IN SCIENCE (1988) (setting out the history 
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A. Inscribing Justice: The Law as a System of Literate and Communal Order 
Law as an activity system serves to regulate human behavior through an 
ordered system of laws, providing rules for behavior, punishment, liability, and 
recompense, and applied to specific cases and adjudicated in the courts. 
Through legal action, everyday matters are brought into the disciplines of law. 
Courts become theatres of determination, looking for closure at the end of each 
performance or episode, inscribing culpability, damage, reward, and 
punishment, and reaffirming a legal order that sets the stage for all future legal 
actions. Related episodes will follow with different actors, settings, and facts. At 
the end of each episode, rewards, punishments, liabilities, and benefits must be 
distributed and settled so life can go on. In its role as the theatre for these 
actions, courts determine facts of events, intentions, and injuries—issues of 
human social life and meaning—that must be set aright by the system of justice 
to maintain social order. 
Courts do not seek, as a direct aim, the best account of nature or scientific 
causality, though judgments on these matters may enter incidentally in judging 
human actions and injury as, for example, intentional or inadvertent. Further, 
courts render judgment only on the immediate matter at hand, although 
judgment as to other, subsidiary matters may be involved, as well, and although 
the reasoning and principles invoked may be consequential as precedent. If the 
evidence or reasoning is inadequate to determine culpability or injury, by 
whatever standard the law determines for the criminal or civil case, the case is 
decided for the defense. If the court is caught in a dilemma, it works its way 
through the dilemma via more legal reasoning. The appellate process that 
reexamines cases is entirely about legal procedures and reasoning, not about 
the facts of the case, which are determined in the trial court. Opening up a case 
for new evidence is permitted only in certain instances and carries a higher 
standard and specific focus. Even then, the matter is usually sent back to the 
trial court, especially in U.S. criminal cases, though less so in civil proceedings. 
The court’s judgment is made by a single individual or a panel. In the 
United States, this judgment is cast in a written statement—whether in the 
 
and spread of a central scientific genre over four centuries); Charles Bazerman, Systems of Genres and 
the Enactment of Social Intentions, in GENRE AND THE NEW RHETORIC 79 (Aviva Freedman & Peter 
Medway eds., 1994) (theorizing the orderly relationship of genres within organized activity systems); 
Charles Bazerman, Singular Utterances: Realizing Local Activities Through Typified Forms in Typified 
Circumstances, in ANALYZING PROFESSIONAL GENRES (Anna Trosborg ed., 2000) (examining how 
specific forms of information appear and are reasoned about within relevant genres); Charles 
Bazerman, Textual Performance: Where the Action at a Distance Is, 23 J. ADVANCED COMPOSITION 
379, no. 2 (2003) (considering how meanings and actions are accomplished at a distance through 
writing); H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959) (setting out how 
interpersonal actions are accomplished in speech); G.H. MEAD, MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY (1934) 
(identifying the role of social communication in the formation of identity and cognition); David R. 
Russell, Rethinking Genre in School and Society: An Activity Theory Analysis, 14 WRITTEN COMM. 504 
(1997) (providing a structural model for understanding the relationship between genres in different 
activity systems); JOHN SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS (1969) (elaborating technical issues in speech-act 
theory); WILLIAM I. THOMAS, THE UNADJUSTED GIRL (Comm. on Publ’ns of the Am. Inst. of 
Criminal Law and Criminology ed., 1923) (observing the sociological concept of social facts). 
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summary form of a jury ballot or the more extended statement of a judge’s 
opinion. Once the judgment enters the record, the conclusion stands as law 
unless overturned by a higher court. The opinion written by the judge further 
sorts out the relevancy and relationships of the various evidence and arguments 
with respect to law and precedent, thereby setting the file in order. 
The law is conservative. New laws are sought only as the conditions of life, 
community values, and perceptions of problems change, so that a rule of law 
can then once again be imposed on an unruly world. Even progressive, 
pragmatic orientations to the law always focus backwards to precedent, 
introducing change only gradually. Both criminal and civil-court cases attempt 
to place the particulars of each case and problematic circumstance into that rule 
of law. In Roman and Napoleonic law, this conservatism and text-boundedness 
are particularly strong: the law is taught and treated as a rational, self-contained 
system, although the history of its interpretation and application as decisions 
and commentary must always have weight, and thus some bearing, on each case 
and on the code. Nonetheless, orderly access to the statutory law has been at 
the heart of the intertextual system within the Roman and Napoleonic systems, 
and references are mediated through the editors or compilers of the law.5 Thus 
Justinian’s Institutes, Code, and the lost and recovered Digest became the keys 
to citation practice through the medieval period, drawing on the volume name 
and then the incipit or initial words of the statute.6 
B.  Common Law, Precedent, and Judicial Opinion in Britain and the United 
States 
In medieval England, practices of statutory citation developed using the 
name of the act and the year of the monarch’s reign or parliamentary meeting. 
By the mid-sixteenth century, however, the dominant printer of legal texts in 
England, Richard Tottell, and the bibliographic system he imposed on his 
legislative yearbooks became the standard for citations.7 This citation format 
reinforced Tottell’s volumes as the definitive location of texts, and other 
printers found it useful to copy his organization even to the numbering of the 
folios or the pagination.8 
Anglo-American law has evolved with a further wrinkle in inscribing the 
world into the law, so that it may be regulated by the law. Because of the legal 
standing given to customary or common law that existed outside royal and 
parliamentary determination, the history of judicial decisions carries special 
weight in determining what the law in any particular case may be and how it is 
 
 5. See Byron D. Cooper, Anglo-American Legal Citation: Historical Development and Library 
Implications, 75 LAW LIBR. J. 3, 4–6 (1982) (providing a history of the English origin of citation 
practices as derived from the Romans in the Middle Ages). 
 6. See id. 
 7. Id. at 9–10. 
 8. See id. at 10 (describing Tottell’s practice of standardizing foliation). 
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to be applied. This means that, in addition to the crafted logic of legislative 
statutes, the various judicial opinions carry weight in creating new law. 
In England, the unwritten law, carried in the memories and judgments of the 
judges and elite barristers, still has standing. Its emphasis is not on the exact 
wording of the opinion, but on its decision and its underlying principle. The 
development of printing provided an increasingly accurate written record, 
which served as a memory aide and as more-certain evidence of the oral 
opinion. Again, the indexing system and pagination of the leading publishers 
became the standard, helping to maintain the place of those practices in the 
market, though over time new indexes replaced the old.9 Still, as with statutory 
law, it was the leading commercial compilation products that defined and 
maintained bibliographic order, and became key reference points for access to 
the law. This commercial compilation and ordering also helped maintain a 
coherence and finiteness to the legally relevant corpus.10 
In the United States, however, the common law has been textualized as 
much as the statutory law. Almost from the beginning of the republic, appellate 
judges were required to write their opinions,11 and this is what the common law 
has come to consist of.12 Although the statutes that might bear on any case are 
finite and specified in the charge or tort, this body of common-law opinions has 
created a large archive that potentially can bear on any decision within the 
appropriate jurisdiction. Since the 1970s, though, courts have been able to 
withhold decisions from publication that they consider not weighty enough or 
not so universal as to be worthy of setting precedent. So, although these 
decisions may be published in some form, it is clearly signaled that they are not 
of precedential value.13 This set of precedential decisions being limited to those 
approved for publication limits their numbers somewhat, but this emphasizes 
the importance of those so selected. 
Judges have written these decisions with an increasing awareness of their 
role not only in deciding the cases before them, but in directing or constraining 
the actions of future courts—the development of rules or tests that lower courts 
must follow as stare decisis precedent. The Daubert rule for the admissibility of 
expert testimony is one such precedent issued by the Supreme Court. It figures 
strongly in the litigation around PPA, to be examined below. Rules or tests are 
also issued by lower courts to set terms of practice and adjudication in their 
jurisdictions. The reports containing carefully written opinions form the largest 
part of the extensive law library needed for effective practice and have provided 
lucrative businesses for the small number of specialized publishers that provide 
 
 9. Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187, 1197–98 
(2007). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 1225. 
 12. Id. at 1188 (“[T]he common law consists of what judges write in their opinions.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 13. E.g., Folks v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., No. 05-1356, 2007 WL 2993595, at n.** 
(10th Cir. Oct. 15, 2007). 
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case reports and the related bibliographic tools for their access. West 
Publishing’s policy of comprehensiveness and accuracy since its founding in 
1876 caused it to become the primary print custodian of judicial opinions, and 
its organization and pagination informed documentation practice.14 The primary 
legal search tool, Shepherd’s Citations, was also keyed to the West reports.15 
Standard bibliographic styles for legal publications emerged fairly recently 
and are regulated primarily through The Bluebook: A Uniform System of 
Citation.16 The Bluebook first appeared in 1926, replacing earlier style manuals.17 
It relied on West’s organization and pagination of cases. Bluebook style moved 
into court practice only in the 1970s, although with it came an almost fetishistic 
obsession with citation correctness, according to a recent article by Gallacher.18 
Nonetheless, some variation in judicial use remains, with some states such as 
California having distinctive styles based on the local publisher of reports and 
the Supreme Court continuing to go its own way. 
With the advent of electronic publication and distribution, LEXIS (now 
LexisNexis) entered the market and eventually was purchased by Elsevier, 
which also purchased Shepherd’s Citations.19 West was purchased by Thomson 
Publishing and became WESTLAW.20 In 2000, the Association of Legal Writing 
Directors issued a competing system, which has gained some acceptance in law 
schools though only limited acceptance in the courts.21 Despite the increasing 
presence of electronic access and dissemination, both publishers (West and 
LexisNexis) and both citation systems rely on the paper pagination in West, 
which is the most comprehensive publisher of federal and state cases.22 
In the scientific world, Elsevier, Thomson, and other large publishers made 
a somewhat similar attempt to gain control over the corpus of scholarly 
publication, but in that world the domains are much more open, and the task is 
much more difficult. Despite Thomson’s accumulation of the core access tools 
of the Web of Science (formerly the Science Citation Index) and Current 
 
 14. Robert Berring, Chaos, Cyberspace and Tradition: Legal Information Transmogrified, 12 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 189, 191–92 (1997). 
 15. Id. at 194–95. 
 16. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 
18th ed. 2005). 
 17. ERWIN GRISWOLD, A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION: ABBREVIATIONS AND FORM OF 
CITATION (1st ed. 1926). 
 18. Ian Gallacher, Cite Unseen: How Neutral Citation and America’s Law Schools Can Cure Our 
Strange Devotion to Bibliographical Orthodoxy and the Constriction of Open and Equal Access to the 
Law 7–8 (Berkeley Electronic Press Legal Series, Working Paper No. 1505, 2006), available at 
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1505/. 
 19. See Berring, supra note 14, at 198. 
 20. Id. 
 21. DARBY DICKERSON, ALWD CITATION MANUAL: A PROFESSIONAL SYSTEM OF CITATION 
(1st ed. 2000). The manual is now in the third edition. 
 22. One scholar argues that this use of West pagination, tied to West’s aggressive legal action to 
maintain copyright control over the pagination, supports monopolistic ownership and that legal practice 
should adopt vendor-neutral citation practices to open up democratic access. See Gallacher, supra note 
18, at 33–34. 
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Contents, along with ownership of a large portfolio of major journals, it has not 
accomplished monopoly control. 
These issues over citation format and monopolistic control of knowledge 
highlight how closely linked citation is to the form and ownership of the 
intertextual corpus that constitutes relevant knowledge. Law has come to 
depend on the emergence of a finite, though growing, corpus of definitive texts 
of precedential cases studied in their letter as well as their spirit. Further, this 
body of texts has become associated with a set of reasoning practices that read, 
interpret, synthesize, and apply the precedential decisions. Particularly in the 
context of stare decisis, this intertextual corpus reduces the flexibility of 
common law,23 while it keeps the pool of relevant intertexts finite. What remains 
of interpretation and interpretive flexibility now tends to center on legal 
reasoning about the precedents, their meanings, implications, and applications. 
Accordingly, the citation system facilitates reference to precise pages and 
paragraphs, pointing to specific, quoted words or phrases or to principles 
embodied within short, focused text passages. 
C.  Scientific Intertextuality and the Communal Project of Scientific Truth 
Science is also a cumulative communal project, but its citation systems and 
underlying intertextual practices are substantially different, coming from a 
different history of citation that really started only in the latter half of the 
eighteenth century. Before that, regularized citation was left largely to the 
humanist scholars and historians who had a finite corpus of well-organized- and 
scrutinized classic texts and chronicles, with multiple editions and copies to sort 
out. Although earlier books of natural philosophy did refer to one another, 
there was little regularized expectation of familiarity with the prior literature, 
let alone any expectation of citing it, summarizing it, and positioning one’s work 
within it. An ideology of natural philosophy as a communal enterprise with 
communal procedures for inscription and aggregation was earlier associated 
with Sir Francis Bacon’s vision of Salomon’s House in the New Atlantis.24 This 
ideology was invoked in the formation of practices of communal witnessing and 
attesting to observed phenomena in the Royal Society and similar natural 
philosophic societies.25 Nonetheless, publications presented work largely as 
individual discovery, coming from the insight, observational acuity, and 
methodological cleverness of the individual investigator. 
 
 23. See Tiersma, supra note 9, at 1205–06 (describing how precedent continues to bind English 
courts). 
 24. See generally SIR FRANCIS BACON, THE NEW ATLANTIS (1626) (describing a mythical 
enlightened land and its institutions of knowledge). 
 25. See generally DWIGHT ATKINSON, SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE IN SOCIOHISTORICAL CONTEXT 
(Charles Bazerman ed., 1999) (analyzing the relation been linguistic forms and social factors in the 
emergence of scientific argument); BAZERMAN, SHAPING WRITTEN KNOWLEDGE, supra note 4; ALAN 
G. GROSS, JOSEPH E. HARMON & MICHAEL REIDY, COMMUNICATING SCIENCE (2002) (comparing 
the development of scientific writing in England, France and Germany); STEVEN SHAPIN & SIMON 
SCHAFFER, LEVIATHAN AND THE AIR-PUMP: HOBBES, BOYLE AND THE EXPERIMENTAL LIFE (1985) 
(examining the social and ideological origins of scientific argument in seventeenth century England). 
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The emergence of natural philosophic journals starting in 166526 created 
more opportunity for exchange that included overt reference to the work and 
statements of others. Such exchange most frequently arose in the context of 
explicit controversy and contestation, as in the exchange over Newton’s new 
theory of light and colors in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 
beginning in 1672 and comprising eighteen published exchanges.27 However, the 
initiating article was told as an individual narrative and set of assertions.28 After 
the exchange of argument and counterargument, Newton withdrew from the 
hand-to-hand combat of journal publication. He published his Opticks29 three 
decades later as a self-contained logical system with no citation of the opposing 
views nor of prior relevant work. In fact, an investigation of all of the 
Philosophical Transactions reveals that a semblance of modern citation practice 
emerged only at the beginning of the nineteenth century.30 
One of the pioneers of modern citation practice and literature review was 
Joseph Priestley, best known for his work as a chemist, but who carried a broad 
enlightenment portfolio from theology, philosophy, and language to history and 
politics, as well as the sciences. In History and Present State of Electricity, he 
argued for taking into account the collected experience of humankind as 
recorded in all scientific works.31 An empirically grounded natural philosophy, 
he argued, needed a comprehensive review of all prior experiences and 
experiments, as well as a history of theories, apparatuses, and investigative 
procedures.32 This shared attention to the collective literature, Priestley 
believed, would not only aggregate experience, but would build common 
understanding, moving science from contestation to communal cooperation and 
shared, explicit, public reasoning about investigation, finding, and theories.33 
While competitive individuality and contestation remain major mechanisms of 
science, they have become embedded within the collective frame of the 
communal record of data and reasoning embodied in the literature. Each new 
contribution must locate itself within and contribute to the literature, while 
distinguishing itself by defining its unique contribution to the collective 
enterprise. 
The specific citation practices for the various disciplines that became labeled 
science in the nineteenth century varied from each other somewhat and were 
gradually codified in this past century in a number of different styles regulated 
 
 26. The first issue of the French Journal des Sçavans is dated January 5, 1665 and the first issue of 
the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society is dated March 6, 1665. 
 27. BAZERMAN, SHAPING WRITTEN KNOWLEDGE, supra note 4, at 100. 
 28. Id. at 87–99. 
 29. SIR ISAAC NEWTON, OPTICKS: OR, A TREATISE OF THE REFLECTIONS, REFRACTIONS, 
INFLECTIONS & COLOURS OF LIGHT (1704). 
 30. BAZERMAN, SHAPING WRITTEN KNOWLEDGE, supra note 4, at 78–79. 
 31. JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, HISTORY AND PRESENT STATE OF ELECTRICITY, Vol. 1, at xviii (1767). 
 32. Charles Bazerman, How Natural Philosophers Can Cooperate, in TEXTUAL DYNAMICS OF THE 
PROFESSIONS 13, 16–17 (Charles Bazerman & James Paradis eds., 1991). 
 33. Id. at 37–39. 
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through manuals and specified by disciplinary journals. Some styles are 
enforced discipline-wide as part of a definition of scientific quality, particularly 
when the most influential journals are owned by the professional society that 
also publishes the manual, as with the American Psychological Association.34 In 
other disciplines, journals vary in their preferred styles. But all of the styles are 
built around and enforced by articles appearing in those journals, with primary 
locators being the journal title, volume or date, and pagination, and the 
publication identifiers being author and title. The differences have to do with 
punctuation, use of abbreviations, placement of the date, and, perhaps most 
significantly, how the citation is tagged to the body of the text. A citation can be 
tagged as an obscure footnote reference number or as a parenthetical reminder 
of author and date, whether in a format that facilitates quotation and specific 
page reference or in a format that facilitates treating the cited text as a single 
unit. Every variation from the conventionally anticipated information (easily 
represented within the standard format) requires extra work and an unusual 
citation form. The disciplinary variations in format generally have arisen from 
the nature of the materials used in the discipline, from the way they enter into 
the discussion, and from the ultimate goals of the work—whether clinical, 
applied, or theoretical. Citation styles and bibliographic tools also embody ideas 
about how knowledge accumulates and interacts to form a collective body of 
disciplinary knowledge.35 
Whichever style is employed, the intertext is treated as fluid and 
progressive, with new knowledge constantly being sought to replace the old, 
and citation lists being biased towards more-recent publications defining a 
research front, against which the new article defines its contribution. Each 
citation, therefore, has a half-life, either deteriorating into obscurity or 
becoming such a standard part of knowledge that it no longer requires citation.36 
The knowledge of fields is codified through this sorting process of citation and 
incorporation into the body of disciplinary knowledge.37 But this is a rolling 
codification, in which new claims and theories replace old ones. Through novel 
investigation by new researchers, the literature constantly reaches out into new 
phenomena, new forms of data, new theories, and more fundamental 
explanations. It does not remain fixed, nor does it seek finality and fixity. If it 
achieves these things, it is no longer a research field, but a fixed body of 
 
 34. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, PUBLICATION MANUAL OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASSOCIATION (5th ed. 2001). 
 35. See generally Charles Bazerman, Codifying the Social Scientific Style: The APA Publication 
Manual as Behaviorist Rhetoric, in THE RHETORIC OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 125 (John S. Nelson, 
Allan Megill & Donald N. McCloskey eds., 1987). 
 36. Derek J. de Solla Price, Citation measures of hard science, soft science, technology, and 
nonscience, in COMMUNICATION AMONG SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS 3, 9 (C.E. Nelson & D.K. 
Pollack eds., 1970). 
 37. ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 516 (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973). 
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knowledge ready for commodification, without need of a supporting 
profession.38 
The ultimate judgment as to which investigations, findings, and publications 
will stand over time as credible and usable is not up to any individual or panel. 
Instead, the judgment is made in the aggregate, communal determination of 
what is useful and cited, as each scientist builds new work on the basis of what 
came before. Results mount up in the literature, and carry force. If a case is 
uncertain or if reasoning and evidence are insufficient, one does not take strong 
stands on the prior work, but rather modulates, proposes alternatives, or seeks 
more evidence through new methods. The need to build on what is credible and 
reliable inflects usability judgments, leading colleagues to evaluate the quality 
of related work. But scientists also evaluate the importance of others’ findings 
to their own work, and therefore the patterns of citation also sort out what is 
most important in the collective enterprise from what is irrelevant, trivial, or 
just uninteresting. In most cases there is little reason to rule negatively on any 
publication that is faulty, obvious, or unenlightening because, in most cases, it 
will simply fade into uncited obscurity. Citation studies regularly show there are 
few negative citations, and many articles are rarely or never cited. Most articles 
are more likely to be ignored than criticized. 
In this process of selective citation, the literature gets organized around 
focused findings associated with particular articles. The findings or meaning of 
each article tends to get compacted into a single concept, and citations become 
concept symbols.39 After a perhaps brief period of uncertain meaning, there is 
less focus on particular wording than on the abstracted finding.40 The article has 
come to be seen as supporting the finding, and the exact words are at stake only 
rarely, when the validity of the claim is being contested. As a result, citations 
have migrated in the direction of holistic citations to entire articles, and formats 
are less convenient for specific page and quotation identification. 
In scientific publication, the practice closest to legal admissibility is the 
refereeing process, which allows a finding to enter into the literature, but which 
transforms it by the pressures of the reviewing process to meet the criteria of 
the referees.41 Nonetheless, the relevance of a published article then is up to 
each new researcher who selects and repurposes articles from the literature. 
Within this communal project of scientific inquiry, publication, and 
codification of the intertext, there is no fixed time frame within which any 
problem must be solved or any account must be settled, unlike each judicial 
proceeding, in which the case must be decided. Although, in science, various 
practical concerns might place an exigency on finding a solution—for example, 
on treating an epidemic disease or on producing results that might warrant 
 
 38. ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS 146–47 (1988). 
 39. Henry G. Small, Cited Documents as Concept Symbols, 8 SOC. STUD. SCI. 327, 328 (1978). 
 40. See generally Susan E. Cozzens, Comparing the Sciences: Citation Context Analysis of Papers 
from Neuropharmacology and the Sociology of Science, 15 SOC. STUD. SCI. 127 (1985). 
 41. GREG MYERS, WRITING BIOLOGY 63–100 (1990). 
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continuation of a grant—there is no absolute institutional time exigency on any 
matter. Additionally, in the course of investigation, a researcher might find 
something she was not looking for, transform one research question into 
another, narrow or broaden her focus, or otherwise get sidetracked from the 
initial task. In fact, such evolution of attention and effort is the expectation in 
most investigations as one finds out about one’s subject. 
Whereas law is constituted and regulated in each jurisdiction, with supreme 
authority currently located in the nation or state, science is international, 
although its practice might be regulated, sponsored, or used within each 
jurisdiction. So, while science in each state might be responsive to and 
dependent on political, social, economic, and legal conditions, science as a 
whole is a separate system, unregulated except by its internal dynamic. The 
work of science may migrate to any hospitable state, and the findings can 
migrate across borders (except when the findings are created under conditions 
of state secrecy). So, again, it is the collective judgment of working scientists 
that evaluates what constitutes valid and significant work. 
D.  The Meeting of the Legal and Scientific Documentary Systems 
Both legal and scientific systems are intended to inscribe significant parts of 
the world, but in ways that are not necessarily congruent. One system, law, 
judges human actions and intentions in order to regulate behavior and to sort 
out punishments, liabilities, and transfers, and so to maintain an appearance 
and substance of justice that facilitates citizen adherence to the regulated order. 
The other system, science, attempts to come to truths about the physical, 
biological, and social worlds, but without passing judgment or ascribing 
punishment or reward (although these may appear as secondary consequences). 
Nonetheless, science and law often meet. As science is carried out within 
one political jurisdiction or another, its practitioners are attentive to the 
regulations, needs, and opportunities of that jurisdiction. For example, scientists 
are at times the litigants in judicial cases, either as plaintiffs suing for rights or 
for resources to practice science or as defendants whose scientific practice is 
being regulated.42 Many of the expert witnesses or scientists whose published 
work is used in cases are employed by state agencies or in institutions that 
receive state support and are responsive to state mandates.43 The key study in In 
re Phenylpropanolamine Products Liability Litigation,44 the Yale Hemorrhagic 
Stroke Project (HSP),45 for example, was at the intersection of complex public, 
private, and corporate interests, since it was carried out by the FDA in 
 
 42. These issues are not discussed here, although it is obvious that the research on PPA was 
focused and shaped by the jurisdiction in which science was practiced—the regulated medical and 
pharmaceutical practice within the United States. 
 43. See, e.g., William N. Kernan et al., Phenylpropanolamine and the Risk of Hemorrhagic Stroke, 
343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1826 (2000). 
 44. In re Phenylpropanolamine Prods. Liab. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1230 (W.D. Wash, 2003). 
 45. Kernan et al., supra note 43. 
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collaboration with authors employed at both public and private universities, 
using data from public and private hospitals, and funded by highly regulated 
pharmaceutical corporations.46 
The focus here is rather on the court’s need for science in making its 
judgments. How do courts admit scientific knowledge? What weight does 
scientific literature carry in the legal system? And how is science used in 
deliberating judgments once it appears in court? In particular, this article looks 
at two related documents that still have authoritative presence in medical 
science and in court: the published study of the Yale Hemorrhagic Stroke 
Project47 and Judge Rothstein’s opinion on the Daubert hearing in 
Phenylpropanolamine Products.48 This opinion admits expert testimony on the 
strength of the HSP study, published in The New England Journal of Medicine 
(NEJM). Both the HSP study and the opinion are considered here in the 
context of prior texts on the science and litigation of PPA. And although both 
have authoritative presence concerning PPA and some special characteristics 
related to that authority, they share many characteristics with texts of a period 
before the issues came to be sorted out into authoritative views. 
III 
EXPERT TESTIMONY AS THE ENTRY POINT OF SCIENCE INTO THE COURTS 
In all the many PPA court cases, scientific literature and scientific opinion 
are filtered through the testimony of expert witnesses. That is, individuals 
testify, and it is they—not the science—who are being measured for their 
credibility, just as any other witness would be. But an expert witness’s authority 
to speak comes from his expertise, which allows him to comment on and 
evaluate the state of knowledge and the particular medical records of a case. 
Accordingly, the scientific literature and other documentary records (other than 
those reporting directly on matters in the case) are not direct evidence in the 
case, in the way a bank robber’s note to the teller or a surveillance-camera 
photo would be; instead, the scientific foundation serves only to authenticate 
the expert’s expertise and opinion. The scientific literature is neither read 
directly nor taken as a whole by the fact finder. Its general weight is not 
evaluated. Nor is the relative weight and meaning of each constituent part—nor 
its contributory role to a larger conclusion—considered. Scientific conclusions 
are not drawn through scientific reasoning, nor are they used in pursuit of 
further inquiries. Rather, the scientific literature comes filtered, shaped, and 
accountable through the individual expert witness, who must be taken as 
speaking authoritatively even to be permitted to be heard. 
The aspect of the testimony subject to judicial opinion is its admissibility—
whether the expert witness may testify or whether the expert’s deposition can 
 
 46. Id. at 1826, 1832. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Phenylpropanolamine Prods., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1230. 
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be entered into the court record as evidence. The deposition process, in fact, 
allows the judge to evaluate beforehand the testimony of the expert witness to 
see whether it meets the criteria for admissibility. Of course, all evidence, even 
a bank robber’s note, is subject to rules and challenges about admissibility. If 
they are judged as admissible, these documents can stand as evidence. In the 
case of expert witnesses, however, it is only their opinions or testimony that 
carries evidentiary weight, with the underlying scientific literature merely 
supporting admissibility and credibility. 
A complete study of the ways the scientific literature is used to establish 
admissibility and credibility would require a full examination of all the legal 
filings, depositions, briefs, and courtroom arguments on both sides. However, 
this article is limited to judicial rulings and opinions on admissibility and weight 
once admitted. These judicial opinions, reflecting a judge’s evaluation of all the 
issues and evidence presented, constitute the residue of legal reasoning, which 
forms the primary record and statement of the meaning of the case after its 
conclusion. 
The court establishes standards to regularize what is admissible as expert 
testimony. The federal rules of evidence presuppose two distinct kinds of 
witness. The lay witness is important strictly for what he has observed, not what 
he thinks or knows beyond the case, and the main evaluation of the testimony is 
of the trustworthiness of the witness’s character and observational skills. Expert 
witnesses, on the other hand, likely will not have specific personal knowledge of 
the case at hand. Typically, they learn the particulars of the case only through 
records or through examining artifacts. The judgments they make may rely on 
evidence beyond what might be admissible. Their expertise grants them broader 
license for their opinions than that given lay witnesses, even to the point of 
permitting their direct opinions on the issue being judged in the case.49 In short, 
expert witnesses do not necessarily have any direct observations to report but 
are valued for their opinions, not, like lay witnesses, for their personal 
trustworthiness, but for their expertise. Their testimony can be impeached only 
by attacking that expertise or, more precisely, its relevance and use in the case 
at hand. Thus, it is not uncommon in cases ruling on the admissibility of 
testimony for the judge to offer effusive praise for the credentials, reputation, 
and competence of the expert witness while ruling her testimony inadmissible. 
The question of admissibility of expert testimony in the United States goes 
back at least as far as the 1923 case Frye v. United States, which resulted in a 
broad test of general acceptance within any one relevant scientific community.50 
Since 1993, the Supreme Court decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,51 has been the ruling law. It reaffirms the role of the judge 
 
 49. Except their opinion concerning criminal insanity. See FED. R. EVID. 704(b). 
 50. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 51. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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as the gatekeeper of scientific-expert testimony as expressed in the Federal 
Rule of Evidence 702, which reads, 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in 
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts 
or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the 
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.52 
The Daubert decision explicitly recognizes the judicial procedures as being 
different from evaluative procedures in science. The judicial gatekeeping has to 
do with the relevancy and usefulness to trying the matter at hand, rather than 
the long-term production of scientific truth. 
Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand, must 
resolve disputes finally and quickly. The scientific project is advanced by broad and 
wide-ranging consideration of a multitude of hypotheses, for those that are incorrect 
will eventually be shown to be so, and that in itself is an advance.53 
Despite its recognition of these evaluative differences, the Court held that 
the trial judge needed to rule on whether the testimony was grounded in 
science, which would include an evaluation of both scientific knowledge and 
method.54 The Court identified four criteria for determining whether expert 
testimony is valid scientific knowledge: first, “whether [the theory or technique] 
can be (and has been) tested”; second, “whether the theory or technique has 
been subjected to peer review and publication”; third, “the known or potential 
rate of error”; and, fourth, the “identification of a relevant scientific community 
and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that 
community.”55 The court further instructed that judicial inquiry should be 
limited to “principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they 
generate.”56 
Insofar as the court’s logic suggests criteria different from that practiced in 
the expert’s field, there is the potential for tension over the value of the expert’s 
findings. Since Daubert, there has been controversy over the reasonableness of 
these criteria and whether they are based on an appropriate understanding of 
science.57 There also has been controversy on how strictly and comprehensively 
these criteria should be applied and whether all need be met. Further, there is 
unease in the way scientific knowledge gets played out within an adversarial 
court system in which each side tries to establish its witnesses as more expert 
and to undermine the expertise of the other side—that is, whose knowledge 
 
 52. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 53. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. 
 54. Id. at 592–93. 
 55. Id. at 593–94. 
 56. Id. at 594. 
 57. See, e.g., 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (SUPPLEMENT 1) S1 (2005). The entire special issue is 
devoted to the implications of Daubert. 
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(and method upon which such knowledge rests) will stand as fact within the 
court records.58 
Despite the controversies over the Daubert rules or the particulars in each 
case, once a court has ruled those criteria as having been met by testimony, the 
science is “authoritative” from the court’s perspective, obviating the need for 
any finer judgments. 
IV 
THE CASE OF PPA LITIGATION 
A number of PPA cases have been litigated in the post-Daubert period. 
They concern whether hemorrhagic strokes or other medical conditions were 
caused by PPA, a common ingredient in appetite suppressant and in cough and 
cold products from the 1970s until recently. In November 2000, the FDA 
recommended a voluntary withdrawal of products containing PPA; 
subsequently it started procedures to outlaw over-the-counter sales of these 
products. As of February 22, 2007, LexisNexis listed one U.S. Supreme Court 
ruling, eighteen federal courts of appeals rulings, and ninety-four federal-
district-court rulings relating to PPA.59 State cases are many times that number.60 
Most of the federal rulings represent distinct cases, but twenty-nine ruled on the 
multiparty, multidistrict case In re Phenylpropanolamine.61 
Some of the cases occurred before work was completed on an 
epidemiological HSP study that came to be treated as authoritative by scientists, 
regulators, courts, and pharmacological companies alike. This study was first 
issued as a report on May 10, 2000, then published in the NEJM.62 Once this 
study became accepted as adequate epidemiological evidence to be admitted 
and upheld in major rulings, it dampened the controversy and made moot some 
of the complex handling of expert testimony in earlier cases. This article 
examines the study as an example of scientific patterns of intertextuality and 
then considers the ruling that accepted the study as the basis of authoritative 
opinion. 
A.  Intertextuality in the NEJM Paper 
The NEJM paper is typical of scientific papers in its intertextuality, and it 
indeed cites much of the prior literature on the issue of the kind and substance 
 
 58. Even further, commercial interests brought into court may suppress scientific findings or 
otherwise intervene in scientific debate for commercial advantage, as was reported to have occurred in 
the case of PPA. Kevin Sack & Alicia Mundy, Over-the-Counter Peril, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2004, at 
A1. 
 59. LexisNexis online search under “Phenylpropanolamine,” Feb. 22, 2007. 
 60. Id. 
 61. In re Phenylpropanolamine Prods. Liab. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1230 (W.D. Wash. 2003). 
 62. Kernan, supra note 43, at 1826. 
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that would have been available in the previous court cases.63 The most overt sign 
of intertextuality is the explicit citation, but it is worthwhile considering as well 
some implicit intertextual references and reliances. The citation system in 
NEJM uses superscript numbers keyed to a references list presented in the 
sequential order they first appear in the article. It is a kind of hybrid of “works 
cited” with footnote systems. Though the sequential numbering system is far 
from universal in the sciences, the substance of the information presented 
within the citation, as well as the punctuation, are common. The citation system 
in NEJM allows efficient repetition of the citations, but is more cumbersome 
than most science-citation systems for specific page references because the 
citation list includes only inclusive pagination, and the superscript numbers do 
not provide an easy place for exact page references. Further, using superscript 
numbers as text anchors (rather than parenthetical author names or other 
recognizable text identifiers) suppresses author identification in the text as well 
as specific discussion of the article. It does not easily facilitate identification of 
quotations. Instead, it treats references as background in the literature, to be 
taken as underlying support but not to be actively discussed. 
This system presents the HSP investigation reported on in the article in an 
unencumbered foreground even more than most systems. Indeed, in several 
places citations are presented en masse, to demonstrate the weight of the 
literature rather than indexing a specific determinative finding or identifying a 
finding to be discussed in detail. Thus the first cited claim aggregates nine 
citations, which then embeds even more reports: “Since 1979, more than 30 case 
reports have been published that describe the occurrence of intracranial 
hemorrhage after ingestion of phenylpropanolamine.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9”64 The next 
sentence repeats three citations and adds four more, to make a further 
specifying claim about documented cases: “Affected patients were most 
commonly adolescent girls or young women between the ages of 17 and 45 
years who were using phenylpropanolamine-containing appetite suppressants, 
often for the first time.7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13”65 The characterization of these articles as case 
reports identifies the level of data they provide, and allows them to be taken as 
a kind of anecdotal evidence of a possible association, significant in their 
accumulation as indicating something worth investigating further and more 
systematically, but not yet establishing any relation. Other, even less-formal 
evidence is then cited from medical reports filed with the FDA, but not rising to 
the level of peer-reviewed scientific publication. For example, “In addition to 
the published reports, between 1969 and 1991, the Food and Drug 
 
 63. The original HSP study, issued eight months earlier, is similar in structure and citation patterns 
to the published article, and therefore this analysis with minor modifications would hold for that one as 
well. Accord RALPH I. HORWITZ, LAWRENCE M. BRASS, WALTER N. KERNAN, & CATHERINE M. 
VISCOLI, PHENYLPROPANOLAMINE AND RISK OF HEMORRHAGIC STROKE: FINAL REPORT OF THE 
HEMORRHAGIC STROKE PROJECT (2000), available at www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/00/backgrd/3 
647b1_tab19.doc. 
 64. Kernan, supra note 43, at 1826. 
 65. Id. 
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Administration (FDA) received 22 spontaneous reports of hemorrhagic stroke 
associated with phenylpropanolamine in appetite suppressants (16 cases) or 
cough and cold remedies (6 cases) (Jolson HM: personal communication).”66 
These case reports constitute the entire review of the literature. They also 
constitute well over half of the cited papers (thirteen of twenty-three, plus the 
FDA spontaneous reports not in the numbered reference list). No biology, 
chemistry, medical analysis, public health, or other literature is overtly 
referenced, though the existence of that literature is implicit within the 
definitions and uses of PPA presented in the opening sentences: 
“Phenylpropanolamine is a synthetic sympathomimetic amine commonly found 
in appetite suppressants and cough and cold remedies. Each month, millions of 
Americans use products containing phenylpropanolamine.”67 The general 
chemical, pharmacological, and public-health backgrounds, along with the 
specific case reports, establish the research space and problem for the current 
investigation, typical of the “create a research space” model found across 
contemporary sciences.68 Although the general problem comes from 
pharmacology, medicine, and public health, the immediately relevant 
literature—the research-space framework, actively invoked to define the 
current limits and knowledge and a gap to be filled by the study—is anecdotal 
case reports. Their use indicates a potential problem. Implicitly, according to 
the standards of the field, such a concern would call for a randomly sampled, 
large-scale epidemiological study. The current article then aims to fill this gap: 
“In response to the concern raised by these case reports, in 1992 we 
collaborated with the FDA and manufacturers of phenylpropanolamine to 
design the Hemorrhagic Stroke Project, a case-control study . . . .”69 
The methods section, for the most part, does not explicitly refer to other 
literature, though the standards of the field embodied in the cumulative 
literature are implicit throughout in the identification of the studied population, 
in the manner of data collection, and in the statistical analyses applied. As is 
standard practice for statistical analysis, specific named tests and procedures are 
applied, each of which has an embedded literature. Some of the procedure 
names were in fact eponymic (Fisher’s test, O’Brien-Fleming spending 
function).70 Specific computer programs and commercial software suppliers used 
for the analysis are mentioned as well,71 to verify the standardness of procedures 
and to allow reexamination of the data and analysis. Moreover, the tools of 
investigation are themselves congealed literature, embodying principles from 
the literature used in their design.72 Although scientific articles do sometimes 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. JOHN M. SWALES, GENRE ANALYSIS: ENGLISH IN ACADEMIC AND RESEARCH SETTINGS 140 
(1990). 
 69. Kernan, supra note 43, at 1826. 
 70. MERTON, supra note 37, at 298–302. 
 71. Kernan, supra note 43, at 1827. 
 72. BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE 66 (1979). 
06_BAZERMAN__CONTRACT PROOF_.DOC 4/2/2009  11:13:09 AM 
Winter 2009] HOW DOES SCIENCE COME TO SPEAK IN THE COURTS? 109 
cite methodological literature—particularly if something is novel, unusual, or in 
question—here, in the paper’s methods section, procedures are treated as 
largely standard, except for the particular difficulties of the study, which are 
treated as local adaptations of general principles. Also, the critical procedures 
referred to in such a section would be read by a professional audience,73 who 
would confirm the procedures’ conformity with standard practice in the 
literature of the field. One rhetorical function of such sections is to confirm that 
this work was done as any competent scientist in the field would do it, and 
therefore the results should not be questioned. Clear conformity to the 
literature avoids raising any red flags regarding methodology and is thus a 
useful strategy for gaining acceptance. The primary exception to the 
implicitness of the literature in the methods section is the citation of three 
articles pointing to specific findings that help identify procedures for data 
collection and analysis. 
Some patients with subarachnoid or intercerebral hemorrhage may have a transient 
headache hours or days before the onset of symptoms that lead them to seek medical 
attention.14, 15 The cause of these sentinal headaches is not known, although clinicians 
infer that some may be due to minor bleeding.16 Accordingly, for patients with such 
headaches we defined a modified focal time as the time of onset of the sentinal 
headache. We used this definition in secondary analysis.74 
Two standard reference works were also cited to confirm the formulation of 
the products patients reported as using. In certain cases, when questions had 
arisen of product change or generic or store brand, the authors had cross-
checked with manufacturers, making manufacturers’ records also part of the 
implicit intertext. 
There is another kind of intertextuality in the use of hospital and interview 
records as data for the study, including many reported compromises made to 
address the contingencies of the study, with explanations and rationales as to 
why these should be allowed without compromising the integrity of the study.75 
The authors of the NEJM article work hard to argue that the available records 
meet the standard of epidemiological method despite a number of specific 
shortcomings and compromises. The data tables aggregate these inscribed data 
and are intertextually dependent on them, as are the discussion and conclusions 
about health risks. One method of questioning the claims of the article would 
be to examine the records and interview data in order to seek irregularities 
within them, the way they are aggregated in the article, or their reliability as 
epidemiological data. 
In the discussion portion of the paper, citations of a prior epidemiological 
study and previously cited case reports are presented as agreeing with the study. 
But they do not live up to the accomplishment boasted: “Our study establishes 
strong epidemiological evidence of the association . . . .”76 This is the desired 
 
 73. BAZERMAN, supra note 4, at 260. 
 74. Kernan, supra note 43, at 1827. 
 75. Id. at 1828. 
 76. Id. at 1831. 
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speech act the article aims to accomplish—the illocutionary force, as Austin 
would call it.77 But of course, as Austin would also point out, the success of the 
speech act would depend on the uptake of the readers, that is, how the readers 
would use their understanding of the text in consequent actions, what he would 
call the perlocutionary effect.78 To forestall objections readers might have that 
might undermine their understanding of the claim as a speech act, three more 
citations recognize potential limits of the study based on potential biases 
established in the literature.79 But each of these potentially undermining 
citations is met with a methodological rejoinder explaining how each potential 
bias was controlled for in this case.80 A final citation is used to calculate 
potential overall impact if carried across the entire population.81 
Overall, this article draws widely and complexly on a multidimensional 
research and methodological literature, some evoked implicitly and other, 
specific items brought explicitly to the citational foreground in order to frame 
the importance, meaning, and value of the current study and its findings. 
However, none of this literature is quoted, examined in detail, or interpreted as 
to the exact meaning, limitations, or implications of its precise wording. In using 
this literature, the authors distinguish between that which is widely known and 
accepted and that which is contested, uncertain, and at stake. The widely 
accepted is typically taken as common knowledge, a given, or as guidance for 
pursuing the investigation in ways that will be credible, meeting the 
expectations of good work. Widely accepted work thus establishes criteria for 
the acceptance of new work, thereby helping establish conditions that must be 
met in order for the new work to accomplish successfully the desired act 
associated with the genre. Such epidemiological studies and the articles 
reporting them aim at establishing an association between a condition (medical, 
pharmacological, environmental, et cetera), and a health result within a 
substantially sized, defined population. To do so, an epidemiological study must 
match multiple expectations of what constitutes a valid piece of work; such 
expectations have developed over the history of contention in the literature of 
what findings could be taken as valid. Nonetheless, findings of a lesser sort, 
which do not match the standards to which the NEJM article aspires or which 
attempt to accomplish something different, are cited and used as positive 
indicators of a problem to be investigated, or as a clarifying constraint directing 
analytical procedures, or confirmation of the study. Further shortcomings of the 
sample, data, and analysis are also recognized and explained. Thus, the article 
depends on a complex weighing and argumentative synthesis of many pieces, 
leading to an overall evaluation of the weight of the evidence. In the long run, 
whether the speech act stands and the claimed association is taken to be true, 
 
 77. See AUSTIN, supra note 4, at 121–22. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Kernan, supra note 43, at 1831. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See id. 
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acted upon, and accepted as the basis for further studies that reconfirm and 
extend its truth, depend on the readers’ uptake in their future actions. 
If there were no urgent health, regulatory, commercial production, or legal 
consequences of the article’s findings, there would be no exigency for a reading 
audience to make an immediate, definitive judgment on its content. Rather, the 
study would go into the mill of ongoing science to see whether it would be 
accepted as reliable and useful to future researchers. That usefulness and 
reliability would establish the facticity or solidity of the result, leading to its 
codification within the canon of knowledge. The exigency of legal proceedings, 
reflecting urgent human stakes, however, puts new pressures on the gradual 
judgments of science and pushes for judgment even when scientific judgment is 
not yet final. 
B. Science in the Daubert Consideration of In re Phenylpropanolamine 
Legal cases concerning PPA before and after the Yale study vary in the 
extent to which they pay attention to the scientific literature. Most are 
concerned entirely with legal matters and do not cite or mention the scientific 
literature. 82 Typically, the matters being ruled on involve only legal questions 
and not the substance or admissibility of expert testimony. Even when 
considering issues surrounding expert witnesses, the discussion may be entirely 
legal. However, when it concerns admissibility, the discussion may briefly 
include the science, though within a predominantly legal context, framed by the 
Daubert criteria.83 In a rare case, the judge undertakes a detailed scrutiny of 
specific procedures, analyses, and practices that stand behind the opinions of 
the expert witnesses. Most notably, in a lengthy opinion in Soldo v. Sandoz, the 
defendants were granted summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff’s 
expert testimony was inadmissible.84 The ruling was based on a detailed critique 
of the methods and practices of the plaintiff’s expert witnesses respecting 
specific facts and opinions they had reported.85 In effect, the judge was ruling on 
specific “scientific facts” that would have been relied on in the plaintiff’s case.86 
In the multidistrict litigation In re Phenylpropanolamine, the Yale study was 
accepted as authoritative science and as the basis of admissible expert opinion.87 
In its Daubert hearing, the lawyers for the several plaintiffs offered the 
testimony of fourteen expert witnesses, all advancing the theory of the Yale 
 
 82. See, e.g., Love v. Wyeth, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (N.D. Ala. 2008); Kobar ex rel. Kobar, 378 F. 
Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Ariz. 2005). 
 83. See, e.g., Globetti v. Sandoz Pharms., Corp., 111 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (considering 
whether expert testimony on the causation of myocardial infarction satisfied the Daubert requirements 
of scientific methodology and evidentiary reliability). 
 84. Soldo v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434, 577 (W.D. Pa. 2003). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Almost three-fourths of the Soldo opinion consists of findings of fact. See id. 
 87. See In re Phenylpropanolamine Prods. Liab. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1239–40 (W.D. Wash. 
2003) (reviewing the qualifications of the Yale study as basis for expert testimony). 
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study and relying on that study as evidence.88 Defendants moved to have this 
expert testimony excluded. They particularly called into question the experts’ 
reliance on the Yale study, which their attorneys claimed was unreliable in 
some respects.89 In this hearing, testimony on several items not covered in the 
Yale study was also ruled on—some ruled admissible, some inadmissible.90 The 
comparison of how these issues were handled provides insight into the ways in 
which scientific literature enters into judicial reasoning. 
In the In re Phenylpropanolamine opinion, the judge first reviews the history 
of the use of PPA in pharmaceuticals and in associated reports of hemorrhagic 
strokes.91 This history is told as uncontested factual background in an absolute 
narrative, without citation or contestation, referring to many documents, 
published and unpublished, including “thirty published case reports” 
(apparently taken uncited from the language of the NEJM article on the Yale 
study).92 Governmental groups and actions are mentioned and their rules 
actually quoted, but with no specific, standard citations to anchor the events 
and quotations, or to make them accessible to others.93 Similarly, studies are 
mentioned by the name of the primary author, such as the published “Jick 
Study”94 and the unpublished “O’Neill and Van de Carr study”95 and “Dr. 
Jolson’s SRS study”96 of the FDA database of spontaneous reports—but again 
without formal citation or a convenient way to locate the texts. This background 
ends with an extensive discussion of the history, methods, and findings of the 
Yale study, mentioning the final report—but not providing a citation—and then 
reporting the FDA request for voluntary withdrawal of the product, again 
without specific documentation.97 This is all presented as history stipulated by 
the court, an official narrative of the facts, not needing specific anchoring in the 
actual documents. 
The only document actually cited in this section is at the end of this 
narrative, the NEJM study itself.98 The citation is presented as part of a 
historical event bearing on the admissibility of the expert testimony—in 
particular, in relation to the Daubert criteria of peer review and publication. 
That is, the fact of publication is used as evidence of the expertise of the 
witnesses, not as a way of engaging the substance of the scientific intertext. 
 
 88. Id. at 1236. 
 89. Id. at 1245–46. 
 90. See, e.g., id. at 1251 (finding certain testimony on the relationship between PPA and cardiac 
injuries inadmissible for lack of evidentiary support). 
 91. Id. at 1234. 
 92. Id. at 1235. 
 93. E.g., id. at 1234 (“In 1976, an FDA advisory review panel recommended . . . .”). 
 94. Id. at 1241. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1235. 
 97. Id. at 1236. 
 98. Id. (“In December 2000, The New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) published the HSP 
results in a lead article. See Walter N. Kernan et al., Phenylpropanolamine and the Risk of Hemorrhagic 
Stroke, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1826 (2000) [hereinafter NEJM Article]”). 
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C. Legal Reasoning About Meeting the Daubert Standard 
After this background narrative, the judge begins the discussion with four 
pages of the Daubert standard and related cases, with detailed legal citations, 
including page or paragraph references to the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
several cases, including Kennedy v. Collagen Corp, Kumho Tire Co. v 
Carmichael, General Electric Co. v. Joiner, Domingo v. T.K., and two opinions 
in Daubert.99 This detailed analysis of the legal precedents includes quotations 
from rules and judgments, which are then interpreted as to limits, applications, 
and implications.100 The analysis proceeds through legal reasoning to determine 
what the Daubert standard is and how it is to be applied.101 This is a discussion of 
legal rules, reasoned through legal documents. The precise reading is made 
explicit so that litigants can satisfy themselves about what these documents say, 
or can contest the interpretation in a further appeal. The judge notes, in 
particular, that epidemiological studies are already held in legal literature as 
well received by courts in mass tort cases, stating “well-conducted studies are 
uniformly admitted.”102 
In the next section, entitled “Defendants’ Daubert Challenges,” the judge 
considers challenges to documents underlying the study.103 These preliminary 
rulings refer to the defendants’ claim that evidence of causation for medical 
events occurring more than three days after ingestion of PPA was insufficient.104 
Because none of the cases in the litigation went outside the three-day window, 
and because the plaintiffs offered no further argument or evidence on this, the 
judge excludes opinions on injuries outside the three-day window as 
unreliable.105 This section is under a page in length. 
The most substantive and complex discussion, which is at the heart of the 
defendants’ claims, involves causation of “Hemorrhagic Stroke in Women 
Between the Ages of Eighteen and Forty-nine.”106 This is the lengthiest section 
of the article, encompassing six pages.107 In it, many court opinions are cited 
formally and in detail as part of the legal reasoning.108 It includes as well some 
citations to other kinds of documents. Some of these cite specifically to legal 
handbooks on the use of scientific evidence in courts in order to establish 
standard legal procedure, such as Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and 
Science of Expert Testimony,109 and the Federal Judicial Center’s Reference 
 
 99. In re Phenylpropanolamine Prods. Liab. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d. at 1236–38. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 1238. 
 103. Id. The judge had already ruled on two documents that had been specifically cited. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1238–44. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1239 (citing DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW 
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (1997 ed.)). 
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Manual on Scientific Evidence.110 The opinion includes quotations from both the 
FDA study and the NEJM article to show the methodological caution they 
exhibit, so as to meet objections based on their “flaws” and to handle those 
objections as advised in the legal canon.111 The quotations are not for scientific 
interpretation but only to demonstrate that the studies correspond with the 
Daubert standard. One footnote indicates textbooks cited by the expert 
witnesses to show the general acceptance of the PPA causation theory.112 The 
textbook and treatise citations are evidence of widespread scientific acceptance, 
specifically of PPA as a risk factor for strokes, which enhances the reliability of 
the plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions and which is mentioned in Daubert as a 
potential factor in admissibility.113 
D. Defense Challenges to the Science and the Court’s Reasoning About the 
Scientific Literature 
At this point in the ruling, however, in responding to specific challenges to 
the scientific status of the findings relied on by the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, 
as well as to their conclusions, the judge’s handling of the scientific literature 
changes. First, the judge cites an article invoked by the defense that appeared 
after the NEJM publication of the Yale study: 
During the final day of the Daubert proceedings, defendants raised challenges relating 
to a new article by the HSP investigators to be published in the June 2003 issue of the 
journal “Stroke.” See Joseph P. Broderick et al., Major Risk Factors for Aneurysmal 
Subarachnoid Hemorrhage in the Young are Modifiable, (Stroke, 2003) (hereinafter 
“Stroke Article”). Defendants assert that this article demonstrates the lack of 
association between PPA and SAHs resulting from the rupturing of an aneurysm 
(“aneurysmal SAH”). The court finds that the defendants distort and misinterpret the 
Stroke Article.114 
The judge then carefully analyzes this article, focusing on what evidence is 
offered in support of which exact claims, and how it does not bear on the matter 
at hand.115 In this sense, the judge engages in a scientific form of reasoning about 
both the Yale HSP study and the more recent article. For example, in support 
of her accepting the explanation of the plaintiffs’ expert that “a p-value cannot 
provide evidence of lack of an effect,” the judge cites an epidemiological 
 
 110. Id. at 1240 (citing FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE (2d ed. 2000)). 
 111. See id. at 1240–41 (citing, inter alia, Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226, 1230–31 (9th 
Cir. 1998), for otherwise useful, opposing, scientific-expert opinions and evidence as going to the weight 
of the evidence, not to its admissibility). 
 112. Id. at 1242 n.11 (“Plaintiffs list over a dozen medical textbooks associating PPA with high 
blood pressure and stroke. See, e.g., John C.M. Brust, Stroke and Substance Abuse, in UNCOMMON 
CAUSES OF STROKE 132, 133 (Julian Bogousslavsky & Louis R. Caplan eds., 2001); THE LITTLE 
BLACK BOOK OF NEUROLOGY 170–72 (James S. Bonner & Jo Jaeger Bonner eds., 2d ed. 1991).”) 
(citation format modified). 
 113. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993). 
 114. In re Phenylpropanolamine Prods. Liab. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 2d at 1243. 
 115. Id. at 1243–44. 
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handbook authored by one of the plaintiff’s expert witnesses.116 The third 
section of the opinion, “Hemorrhagic Stroke in the Various ‘Sub-populations,’” 
follows in the same vein, as the judge counters defense claims that it is 
inappropriate to extrapolate the findings of the Yale study to men, children, or 
people over age forty-nine.117 The judge cites medical literature to establish that, 
in the matter of PPA and similar issues, it is standard medical practice to 
extrapolate.118 She then cites legal precedent to show that such extrapolation has 
been ruled admissible in other cases.119 
In this third section and in a preceding subsection entitled “Recent Article 
on Aneurysmal SAH [Subarachnoid Hemorrhage],” a challenge is raised by the 
defense as to the scientific validity of claims made by the plaintiffs’ expert 
witnesses.120 It is at this point that the judge again enters into scientific 
reasoning. She is put in a position of adjudicating what is appropriate scientific 
procedure and whether certain reported conclusions and findings count as 
proper scientific knowledge so as to be admissible. Thus, the judge must sort 
out conflicting claims, each presenting itself as defining appropriate scientific 
behavior, in order to decide which claims will stand in court as admissible 
expert testimony. In contrast to two earlier subsections of the opinion,121 in 
which the judge was ruling on the general admissibility of a certain kind of 
study, here the court must rule on specific contested claims. 
In subsequent sections,122 the judge is drawn further into sorting out 
conflicting scientific claims against the background of the scientific literature to 
determine the admissibility of the testimony of two of the plaintiff’s expert 
witnesses. Section four considers the testimony of Dr. Steven Levine on 
Ischemic stroke potentially caused by PPA (as opposed to Hemorrhagic stroke, 
which was the subject of the Yale HSP).123 Section five considers Dr. Irvin 
Goldenberg’s testimony on potential PPA causation of cardiac injuries.124 
Neither of these witnesses’ testimonies is supported by the “gold standard” 
epidemiological study, and each must delve more deeply into other types of 
studies in the scientific literature. As the judge notes, they bear a similarity to 
each other in this way; they also bear a similarity to the cases litigated before 
the publication of the Yale study. The judge applies a similar kind of 
intertextual test to each and comes to opposite conclusions. The comparison is 
instructive about the way this judge, at least, considers the cumulative value of 
the scientific literature. The judge notes that Levine’s claim about the causation 
of Ischemic stroke “rests on case and adverse drug reports, biological 
 
 116. Id. at 1243 (citing KENNETH J. ROTHMAN, EPIDEMIOLOGY, AN INTRODUCTION (2002)). 
 117. Id. at 1244–46. 
 118. Id. at 1244–45. 
 119. Id. at 1245. 
 120. Id. at 1243–44. 
 121. See id. at 1239–43 (§§ 2(a)–(b)). 
 122. Id. at 1246 (§ 4, Ischemic Stroke); id. at 1249 (Cardiac Injuries). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 1250. 
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plausibility, comparison to other sympathomimetics and naturally occurring 
conditions with altered sympathetic tone, PPA blood pressure studies, textbook 
and other references, and both [Levine’s] own and others’ clinical 
experience.”125 She notes as well that “the lack of epidemiological evidence does 
not render expert opinions on this issue unreliable” and again cites precedent 
standing for the rule the weakness or flaws in scientific expert evidence go to its 
weight, not to its admissibility.126 Because the volume of evidence is lower than 
that respecting hemorrhagic stroke, the judge calls for a more detailed scrutiny 
of that evidence.127 The judge rehearses the line of reasoning and evidence that 
she finds plausible and relevant. Further, the judge repeats some of the citations 
to the scientific literature that Levine relied on in supporting his own 
reasoning.128 The judge concludes, “The court again finds that the cumulative 
effect of this evidence satisfies the mandate of Daubert.”129 
Although, superficially, Dr. Goldenberg’s expert testimony for the defense 
followed a similar form of reasoning to Dr. Levine’s, the judge rules it 
inadmissible: 
Lacking epidemiological evidence, Dr. Goldenberg drew upon animal studies, human 
clinical trials, case reports, clinical experience, comparison to other 
sympathomimetics, and text book references. He testified as to, inter alia, biological 
plausibility, temporal association, and dose response. Thus, at first glance, Dr. 
Goldenberg’s methodology mirrors that employed by Dr. Levine.130 
Upon “closer analysis,” though, the judge finds “critical distinctions” 
between the two experts. Dr. Goldenberg’s evidence “spreads far too thin to 
reliably support expert testimony.”131 The judge finds, too, that Dr. Goldenberg 
failed to offer any support for his opinion that “some thirty-five different 
biological mechanisms” could account for the link between PPA and cardiac 
injuries.132 Goldenberg’s “primary explanation” for that link was “PPA’s 
vasoconstrictive effect”133; yet another expert witness for the defense had 
testified that “PPA’s vasoconstrictive effect on coronary arteries was extremely 
limited.”134 
The judge notes other differences between Goldenberg’s testimony and 
what was actually to be found in the literature. For example, whereas Dr. 
Goldenberg presented testimony as to individuals consuming human 
therapeutic doses of PPA, “three of the animal studies found no pathology at 
 
 125. Id. at 1246. 
 126. Id. (citing Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226, 1229–30 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 1247. 
 129. Id. at 1248 (citations omitted). 
 130. Id. at 1250. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
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doses significantly beyond human dose, including doses 1000 and 235 times that 
level.”135 
The judge goes on to remark that “beyond offering a few isolated examples, 
Dr. Goldenberg only alluded to the . . . numerous textbooks and treatises 
supporting his opinions.”136 The judge ruled that Goldenberg’s testimony was 
inadmissible on the grounds that it “lack[ed] both the cumulative evidentiary 
support and the thoroughness the court found reliable with respect to both 
hemorrhagic and ischemic strokes.”137 Thus, the underlying issue seemed to be 
how thoroughly the witness drew on the evidence in the literature and how 
tightly he argued from it. The key to judicial evaluation of the admissibility of 
an expert’s testimony, then, is the judge’s evaluating the expert’s use of the 
scientific intertextual resources. 
The Daubert standard of measuring scientific method, on its face, appears to 
evaluate the experimental procedure, itself, as it certainly does in evaluating the 
NEJM article that underlay the testimony of most of the plaintiffs’ expert 
witnesses. Even then, it is ultimately a matter of the experts’ reading and 
application of the literature. With a “gold standard” epidemiological study, 
however, that becomes less problematic. But in the more problematic cases that 
do not rely on a single, definitive study, admissibility was a matter of judging 
how well, comprehensively, and carefully the literature was read by the 
witnesses and how it was used to reason. 
In the PPA products-liability case, the judge seemed willing to accept 
something less than absolute certainty and judge according to the weight of 
published evidence and the arguments based upon it, even when the most 
authoritative kind of study was lacking. In fact, willingness to engage with the 
literature leads the judge to admit expert testimony, so that the jury (should the 
case reach a jury) can decide on the testimony’s value. 
Judges in other cases have taken different positions on the requisite level of 
certainty about causation to make evidence relevant and admissible in 
determining liability.138 Notably, In re Phenylpropanolamine was a group action, 
which puts the issue of statistical probabilities in a different light. The causality 
can be considered in aggregate without sorting out whether it was more likely 
than not to be the cause in each particular case. In that case, too, the judge 
seemed willing to strike a balance between legal reasoning and scientific 
reasoning on issues of admissibility. In many other PPA cases, the judges ruled 
on admissibility only on legal grounds, without significant investigation of the 
scientific literature—which frequently resulted in finding that defense 
challenges raised sufficient doubt to rule the plaintiff’s expert testimony 
 
 135. Id. at 1251 (citing Daubert Hearing Record (May 29, 2003) at 75–76, 83–84). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See, e.g., Buxton v. Lil’ Drug Store Prods., Inc., No. 2:02-CV-178-KS-MTP, 2007 WL 2254492 
(S.D. Miss. Aug. 01, 2007). 
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inadmissible.139 On the other hand, other judges, as those in In re 
Phenylpropanolamine and in Soldo,140 scrutinized the scientific literature and 
practices engaged by the expert witnesses in order to determine the method 
behind specific, detailed claims made by the witnesses. This scrutiny resulted in 
giving credence to most of the shadows of doubt that defense attorneys 
attempted to cast on the plaintiffs’ expert testimony, so as to render that 
testimony inadmissible and to leave the defendant’s set of facts standing as the 
facts of the case.141 In such a case, the court becomes full arbiter of what science 
the fact finder is to hear and attempts to prevalidate what is to be admitted. In 
Soldo, the result was summary judgment in favor of the defendants, for there 
was no substantial case left for the plaintiffs once the expert testimony was 
excluded.142 In taking a middle course, the judge in In re Phenylpropanolamine 
took the scientific challenges seriously enough to examine their plausibility, but 
did not foreclose evaluation of the credibility and relevance by a subsequent 
fact finder. 
V 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Science and the courts are distinct intertextual systems, with different 
domains of relevant texts, different ways of deploying and reasoning with the 
texts, and different methods of inscribing evidence from the nontextualized 
world into their deliberations. Further, they each have limited admission of 
texts from other domains, with procedures for admitting foreign texts, and 
differing uses to be made of them. Neither science nor law is a homogenous 
domain where texts flow freely. Judicial handling of legal texts is bounded by 
national and state jurisdictions and hierarchies within jurisdictions. Scientific 
literatures aggregate in disciplines, specialties, and theory groups, with criteria 
of admission, attentiveness, and forms of reasoning appropriate to each, with 
border controls and suspicion over immigrant texts from neighboring or more-
distant scientific fields. Within each of the domains, the border controls are 
determined by the inhabitants, not the neighbors. Rarely does the neighbor 
have enough standing to negotiate, let alone demand, the terms of admission. 
In the PPA litigation, even in the cases in which science seems to be treated 
most even-handedly, the gatekeeping is entirely on the legal side of the border. 
In the communal process of science, a complex discussion sorts itself out only 
over time by what gets cited in ongoing publication, under no focused 
institutional, situational exigency for immediate resolution. But when science is 
applied to legal matters with judicial exigencies, it is the legal system that 
 
 139. See, e.g., id. 
 140. Soldo v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434 (W.D. Pa. 2003). 
 141. See id. at 576–77 (demonstrating domino effect of concluding plaintiff’s experts do not offer 
scientifically reliable testimony). 
 142. Id. at 577. 
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decides what meanings should be taken from the scientific literature and what 
functional role those meanings will have in legal proceedings. The science is 
carried across the border largely by selected agents within a strategically stage-
managed, advocacy proceeding. The science is filtered through the testimony of 
the (mostly paid) expert witness, and then admissibility as scientific knowledge 
is ruled on by a judge following legal reasoning within the intertext of the law. 
As a result, the intertext of science has only a tenuous and filtered standing in 
relation to specific cases. Scientific findings do not stand as effective and 
prominent speech acts in themselves, establishing facts on the landscape that 
must be attended to. Rather, the scientific literature is at best a warrant for the 
expertise of the opinions expressed by individuals in the roles of expert 
witnesses. It is those admissible acts of opinion that are potentially 
consequential facts within the legal proceeding. 
It offends science, which prides itself on both internationalism of 
cooperation and universality of truth, if its truths and authority cannot flow 
freely across borders. Yet these are different kinds of borders—borders of 
human endeavors and activity systems. Intertextual analysis can help parse out 
what the exact border regulations are and what gets across, with what use and 
effect, according to the procedures established and judgments made by the 
courts. But unless intertextual analysis finds some flimflam in the procedures, it 
cannot pass judgment on what those procedures should be. It is up to the 
participants in the various activity systems to sort out whether those procedures 
meet their needs. 
Nonetheless, scientists are also citizens, who expect their legal systems to act 
justly. If their knowledge as scientists helps them identify injustice, then as 
citizens they have the right and the obligation to ask the courts to redress 
procedures to bring about justice in a complex world, about which science has 
gained some knowledge. Moreover, since so many actors in the world are 
themselves engaged with science as part of their actions (whether 
pharmaceutical companies, environmental organizations, or silicon-chip 
manufacturers), scientists are likely to have observations about the justice with 
which these actors operate. The opinions of scientists might help us better 
evaluate the legality and liability of parties acting with scientific knowledge. 
Intertextual analysis might provide a means of identifying whether the most 
credible science gets into court to have standing as significant fact with 
appropriate bearing in the judicial deliberation. 
Similarly, the courts are committed to justice, and their officers understand 
that in many matters, scientific opinion must be factored in to reach just 
conclusions. Accordingly, courts have adopted procedures, following judicial 
forms of reasoning, to admit scientific and other expert opinions in ways that 
will maintain the character and authority of their courts. If, in examining their 
procedures, they find that the knowledge necessary to make just decisions is not 
being admitted (that is, relevant facts are missing, not part of the record or 
deliberations), or that the manner of admission is impeding knowledge from 
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being used in the way most conducive to justice (that is, the perlocutionary 
uptake of the speech act and fact is skewed), they must reconsider their 
procedures. Again, intertextual analysis might serve as a useful tool for courts 
to sort out whether their procedures lead to the most useful knowledge being 
brought to bear on questions of justice in the most useful way. 
My comments are professionally cautious, because evaluation of the use of 
scientific knowledge in PPA cases involves knowledge and judgment of both 
science and justice—in neither area do I have expertise. I bring only a mode of 
analysis of literate activity systems to examine how they carry out their 
deliberative work. However, as a citizen, from the vantage of my professional 
knowledge, in becoming familiar with PPA litigation I have noted that the 
current and recent procedures for admission of expert testimony have created 
an opening for an aggressive strategy of challenge to keep scientific knowledge 
from court, by casting shadows of doubt. That strategy has also created space 
for pharmaceutical companies and other corporate actors in scientific arenas to 
keep facts from being established in court by keeping findings from publication 
and by sponsoring other publications that muddy the scientific waters. 
This observation brings a third set of institutions into the analysis: 
proprietary corporate organizations with their own sets of interests and modes 
of operation. They also depend on their own complex intertextual systems; 
nonetheless, because they appear in courts—usually as defendants—they are 
treated as legal persons, insulated by the advocates who present their interests. 
The intertextual systems within which they carry out their corporate 
monitoring, reasoning, and governance are not available or accountable to the 
court unless specific documents are subpoenaed or the defendants are charged 
with fraud or malfeasance. Nonetheless, the corporate reasoning embodied in 
their intertextual systems can indirectly affect the scientific intertext available to 
the court. Further, through their advocates, they can make salient particular 
parts of the legal intertext and can bring other suits that will change the legal 
landscape. Finally, they may attempt to influence legislatures and government 
agencies to affect laws, regulations, regulatory policies, and procedures, thereby 
changing the larger context in which courts adjudicate. Thus we might best 
consider the problem of science and the law as a three-body intertextual 
problem—or ultimately an n-body problem, as regulatory agencies, consumer 
groups, legislatures, and other players with their own intertexts of knowledge, 
fact, and reasoning carry out their activities and define their interests. As with 
any n-body problem, it is often useful to make simplifying assumptions based on 
which systems exert the greatest gravitational force in each case. 
 
